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Attention Training in Schoolchildren Improves Attention
but Fails to Enhance Fluid Intelligence
Justyna Sarzyńska, Dorota Żelechowska
The University of Social Sciences and Humanities
Marcel Falkiewicz                                    Edward Nęcka
Fluid intelligence is a critical factor in learning and instruction. It also influences performance
at school and in the workplace. There have been many attempts to directly and indirectly
improve general fluid intelligence by training its underlying cognitive functions, such as work-
ing memory, cognitive control, or attention. The aim of the present study was to determine the
extent to which school-age children’s scores on intelligence tests could be improved by atten-
tion training. After training sessions, which consisted of four computerized cognitive tasks that
practiced various aspects of attention, the children’s scores on an attention test improved, with
fewer false alarms and increased performance speed. This improvement partially persisted over
an extended period of time. However, this effect was not associated with higher intelligence test
scores. These results suggest that attention is possible to develop through short-term interven-
tions but general intelligence is not. We interpret our findings in terms of the three-stratum
theory of human intelligence.
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Attention is at the core of cognition (Posner
& Petersen, 1990; Petersen & Posner, 2012) and
fluid intelligence is the most fundamental cog-
nitive ability (Gottfredson, 1997; Jensen, 1998).
Therefore, it is tempting to check whether both
attention and intelligence can be improved
through planned interventions. Being its cog-
nitive substrate, some aspects of attention are
believed to underlie general mental ability
(Schweizer, Moosbrugger, & Goldhammer, 2005;
Stankov, 1988). If so, the effects of attention
training should generalize to fluid intelligence.
Here we attempt to verify this hypothesis with
the participation of young schoolchildren.
Fluid intelligence is understood to involve
general reasoning ability, problem solving skills,
and abstract thinking in novel situations (Cattell,
1971). The distinction between fluid and crys-
tallized intelligence has been proposed by
Raymond Cattell (1957, 1971) and later devel-
oped by John Horn (1968). According to Cattell,
fluid intelligence (Gf) is a biologically deter-
mined “pure” ability to reason in the inductive
or deductive way, whereas crystallized intelli-
gence (Gc) is a culturally determined ability to
acquire and use knowledge. John Horn (1968;
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Horn & Stankov, 1982) developed the Cattell’s
distinction, adding several lower-level abilities,
such as visual processing (Gv), short-term
memory skills (Gsm), long-term memory skills
(Glr), or speed of processing (Gs). As we can
see, all acronyms contain the letter G, meaning
that these abilities are relatively general in na-
ture, that is, they manifest themselves in nu-
merous and diverse tasks and situations rather
than in some specific settings. John Carroll
(1993, 1997) developed the Cattell-Horn theory
into the form of a three-stratum theory of intel-
ligence. According to his approach, human abili-
ties are organized in three strata, depending on
the number and variety of tasks and situations
in which they can be observed. The most gen-
eral ability is Spearman’s (1927) general factor
g, representing the highest stratum III. The sec-
ond level (stratum II) includes so-called “broad
abilities”, whose number was originally eight
but today it ranges from eight to sixteen, de-
pending on the version of the model. The most
important broad abilities are Gf and Gc, already
proposed by Cattell and Horn. Other II stratum
abilities are, for instance, processing speed or
retrieval ability. The lowest level (stratum I) in-
cludes abilities that manifest themselves in very
specific, narrowly defined tasks. They may also
depend on specific cognitive abilities adopted
by a person. Carroll’s conceptualization of
Cattell and Horn’s ideas is now recognized as
the CHC (Cattell-Horn-Carroll) theory of intelli-
gence. It is regarded to be the most comprehen-
sive model of the structure of human abilities,
supported by confirmatory factor-analytical
studies (e.g., Flanagan & Dixon, 2014;
Gustaffson & Undheim, 1996).
Ideally, it would be suitable to investigate
training effects in reference to all the abilities
described by the CHC theory but such an
agenda is hard to implement in a single study.
Besides, we do not have appropriate, theory-
based tools for the measurement of potential
training effects. For these reasons, we decided
to focus on an ability that is general enough
and predicts significant life achievements,
namely, the general fluid intelligence (Gf). It has
been demonstrated that Gf is an important pre-
dictor of academic achievement (Deary, Strand,
Smith, & Fernandes, 2007), career outcomes and
professional achievement (Ree & Earles, 1992),
as well as health and mortality (Deary, 2008;
Gottfredson, 1997, 2004). Not surprisingly, many
planned interventions that include cognitive
training have sought to improve it. However, it
is not clear whether fluid intelligence is suscep-
tible to such interventions. Many studies have
found that intelligence training yields only lim-
ited effects (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). According
to Sternberg (2008), the training tasks used in
many studies that claim to improve fluid intelli-
gence were very similar to the final tests that
measured training effects (e.g., Kramer & Willis,
2002), which suggests that the training improved
only specific test skills. Although intelligence
test scores can be improved by practicing test
taking, this effect does not contribute to our
understanding of the nature of intelligence and
has limited practical value.
Another line of research shows that improve-
ment in fluid intelligence may result from trans-
fer effects when certain basic cognitive func-
tions are practiced, such as working memory
(Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008;
Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonidas, & Shah, 2011;
Klingberg et al., 2005), executive functions
(Schweizer, Hampshire, & Dalgleish, 2011), or
attention (Rueda, Rothbart, McCandliss,
Saccomanno, & Posner, 2005). Arguments sup-
porting the hypothesis that this type of train-
ing can boost intelligence are as follows. First
of all, many studies indicate that elementary
cognitive functions underlie more complex
ones, such as intelligence (Hunt, 1980;
Sternberg, 1985). Secondly, elementary and com-
plex functions tend to have similar brain sub-
strates (e.g., Duncan, 2003; Hampshire, Cham-
berlain, Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010;
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Shimamura, 2000). Therefore, enhancement of
simpler functions should indirectly affect more
complex ones.
Some functions of attention are believed to
be the cognitive substrate of intelligence
(Nęcka, 1996; Stankov, 1988). For example,
Coull’s model (1998) distinguishes four aspects
of attention: orienting attention, divided atten-
tion, selective attention, and vigilance. All of
them seem to be related to fluid intelligence
(Crawford, 1991; Nęcka, 1996; Roberts, Beh, &
Stankov, 1988; Roberts, Beh, Spilsbury, &
Stankov, 1991; Rockstroh & Schweizer, 2004;
Schweizer, 2001; Stankov, 1988). There is also a
common neural substrate responsible for the
association between attention and intelligence.
Duncan and Owen (2000) found that tasks mea-
suring attention (e.g., Stroop) and intelligence
(e.g., problem solving) both involve activity in
the following brain areas: the dorsolateral and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortices, and the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (see also: Shimamura,
2000).
Rueda et al.’s (2005) study yielded support
for the hypothesis that attention training can
enhance intelligence. Four- and six-year-old
children performed nine (four-year-olds) or ten
(six-year-olds) computerized tasks training dif-
ferent aspects of executive attention (Posner &
Petersen, 1990) over a period of two to three
weeks. Effectiveness was evaluated with the
children’s version of the Attention Network Test
(Rueda et al., 2004) and the Kaufman Brief Intel-
ligence Test (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990). After
training, children’s performance improved on
both behavioral and neural indicators. EEG data
showed that training yielded effects similar to
those associated with brain maturation, particu-
larly in the six-year-olds. Their brain activity
patterns became similar to those observed in
adults. Intelligence test results also improved,
particularly in the components that assessed
fluid intelligence. Karbach and Kray (2009) con-
ducted another study that demonstrated far
transfer effects on intelligence. The authors
applied four different versions of task-switch-
ing training to healthy participants in three dif-
ferent age groups (8-10, 18-26, and 62-76 years).
They checked for near transfer using different
versions of tasks requiring switching, and far
transfer to working memory, inhibitory control,
and fluid intelligence. Regardless of the age
group, participants who trained task-switching
improved their performance in other tasks, in-
cluding intelligence tests. Thus, Karbach and
Kray (2009) demonstrated both near transfer
effects, with criterial tasks similar to training
tasks, and far transfer effects, with criterial
tasks not resembling the training tasks (see:
Shipstead, Redrick, & Engle, 2010).
Tucha et al. (2011) also demonstrated effec-
tive training of attention. Thirty-six children di-
agnosed with ADHD and 16 healthy children
(passive control group) participated in the
study. The children with ADHD were divided
into two experimental groups that trained either
attention or perception. Trainings were held
twice a week for two months. Criterial tests con-
sisted of six computer tasks measuring various
aspects of attention (Zimmermann & Fimm,
2002). Children who underwent attention train-
ing exercised vigilance, selectivity, and divided
attention, according to the AixTent program
(Sturm, Orgass, & Hartje, 2001). Children from
the second experimental group performed the
German version of the Frostig Developmental
Test of Visual Perception (Frostig, Horne, &
Miller, 1972; Reinartz & Reinartz, 1974). The
results showed that children from the first ex-
perimental group improved their scores in tasks
that measured vigilance, flexibility, and divided
attention. Such changes were not found in
healthy control children or children who prac-
ticed perceptual tasks, indicating that the im-
provement did not stem from mere repetition of
assessment with the same tasks.
Tucha et al.’s (2011) study demonstrated both
near and far transfer on previously untrained
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aspects of attention, but the author did not
measure transfer to general intelligence. The
current research therefore aimed at application
of training tasks similar to those used in Tucha
et al.’s (2011) study but also referring to all four
aspects of attention highlighted by Coull (1998).
In contrast to Tucha et al.’s study, we tested
healthy children and controlled for possible
delayed effects of training. We also attempted
to determine whether fluid intelligence could
be improved through attention training with lim-
ited engagement of executive functions. Atten-
tion, executive control, and working memory are
closely related concepts (Friedman et al., 2006;
Klauer & Phye, 2008; Shimamura, 2000;
Unsworth & Engle, 2006). Hence, training ef-
fects are likely to be contaminated and misin-
terpreted. In this study, we deliberately aimed
at training attention with limited engagement of
executive control.
Method
Participants
Fifty-four eight-year-old elementary school
children participated in the study, with 30 (14
male) in the experimental group and 24 (9 male)
in the control group. One child with clinical di-
agnosis of developmental disorders was ex-
cluded from the study. Twenty-seven children
in the experimental group and 23 in the control
group met the compliance criteria of participa-
tion in 10 training sessions and all criterial tests.
All participants took tests measuring intelli-
gence and attention, and then participated in
either attention training (experimental group) or
another cognitive training (control group). Tests
were administered before (pretest) and after all
training sessions (posttest). Additionally, the
experimental group was assessed for the third
time three months after the posttest (follow-up
test), in order to establish the stability of train-
ing effects. Children from both groups com-
pleted 10 training sessions that were held two
to three times a week and lasted approximately
30 minutes. During each session, children per-
formed all training tasks, which means that they
spent approximately 7-8 minutes on each task
in the experimental group (4 tasks) and 15 min-
utes in the control group (2 tasks). The tasks
always appeared in random order.
Criterial Measures
The Standard Edition Raven‘s Progressive
Matrices test (RPM; Raven, Raven, & Court,
2003) was used to assess general intelligence
because it is regarded to provide the best ap-
proximation of the general reasoning ability
(Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984). RPM
consists of 60 questions of increasing difficulty.
Each question presents a matrix of patterns in
which one pattern is missing. The task is to
select the missing pattern among a set of given
alternatives. We used the classical form of RPM
for the pretesting and the parallel version after
the training sessions.
Attention was measured using the d2 Atten-
tion test (Brickenkamp & Zillmer, 1998), which
assesses the overall efficiency of attention.
Participants were given a sheet of A4 paper
containing fourteen lines of letters and were
instructed to cross out properly labeled “d” let-
ters in rows of variously marked “d” and “p”
letters. The task was timed, and participants were
allowed 20 seconds to complete each row so
that they had just under five minutes to com-
plete the entire test. This test provides mea-
sures of perceptual speed, the overall percep-
tual ability (the rate ratio adjusted to the num-
ber of errors), hits (which reflects concentra-
tion) and the number and types of errors (misses
or false alarms). In addition, two measures based
on the Signal Detection Theory (SDT, Green
and Swets, 1966) were added: d’ reflects the
ability to distinguish signal from noise, whereas
c’ provides the bias measure. Higher values of
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c’ indicate a bias towards the conservative
trategy (more correct rejections with greater
number of omissions), and lower values indi-
cate the liberal strategy (increased number of
hits at the expense of higher frequency of false
alarms).
Experimental Training
Four computer games that trained different
aspects of attention were designed for the study.
The “Fish” task required participants to distin-
guish signals from noise. There were several
types of fish swimming in the aquarium, and
children had to operate with a carnivorous fish
that was “eating” fish of one type while ignor-
ing other species. Once 30 fishes were eaten,
the rules changed: children were required to
inhibit their formerly acquired habit and “eat” a
different type of fish. The difficulty of the task
was adjusted to the child’s current level of per-
formance. Training progress was facilitated or
hindered by changing velocity of the fishes,
the number of edible fishes, and velocity of the
fish controlled by the child. Additionally, the
initial game could exhibit one of three levels of
difficulty, differing in the ease with which ed-
ible fishes could be discerned (e.g., shape and
color, shape alone, or shape visible only in the
stream of light switched on by the child). Total
number of wrong fishes “eaten” during the ses-
sion was used as a performance measure.
The “Easter eggs” task, which trained alert-
ness, was modeled on the classic Mackworth
task (1948). In this task, children controlled the
work of a bunny in the Easter egg factory. Col-
ored Easter eggs moved along a conveyor belt,
and the bunny’s task was to reject damaged
eggs or eggs that were not completely colored.
The damage on the eggs became less visible
over time, although the rate at which they moved
along the conveyor belt remained constant.
Total number of incorrect responses was used
as a performance indicator.
The “Apples” task, which assessed orient-
ing attention, was based on Posner’s cuing para-
digm (1978). Children were required to focus on
a fixation point flanked by two boxes and con-
trol the action of a wolf collecting apples that
appeared on both sides of the fixation point.
The task was to press a key as quickly as pos-
sible when an apple appeared inside of one of
the boxes. Additionally, the appearance of
apples was preceded by a cue (appearance of
twigs to one side), although the cues were some-
times misleading. Sometimes the child had to
respond to an apple appearing in the location
where a cue had previously appeared (sac-
cades), and sometimes to an apple appearing
on the opposite side (antisaccades). During the
game, the proportion of correct cues, and the
interval between the appearance of the cue and
the stimulus, decreased. The dependent vari-
able for this task was the total number of incor-
rect responses for each session.
The “Jigsaw” task, which trained divided at-
tention, involved simultaneously playing two
puzzles. An item would appear at the center of
the screen, which the child had to assign to one
of two images that were presented simulta-
neously. We manipulated the difficulty of the
task by dividing the images into an increasing
number of elements, increasing similarity of the
presented images, and shortening the period of
time within which the child could respond. The
total number of correct responses per session
was used as a performance measure.
Control Training
Children in the control group participated in
training with the same intensity and format as
children in the experimental group, but the train-
ing tasks placed minimal demands on attention.
Their training consisted of two tasks practicing
problem solving or perceptual skills. In the
“Mice Game”, players went through a maze col-
lecting pieces of cheese while avoiding ob-
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stacles (such as mousetraps or hamster wheels)
that would send them back to the beginning.
The time to go through the maze was limited,
and difficulty was manipulated by the complex-
ity of the maze, the number of obstacles, and
the amount of cheese to collect. The main goal
of “Machine Space” was to build a machine
from a number of given elements by dragging
them into the right places. To eliminate the role
of memory in the task, players saw a sketch of
this machine. Time to complete the task was
limited and difficulty was manipulated by the
number of elements and their similarity. The
tasks performed by children in the control group
were as attractive as those used in the experi-
mental group, as assessed in post-training in-
terviews.
The same token system was introduced to
enhance motivation in both the experimental and
control groups. After each session, children
could choose a sticker to be placed on a card
that they had previously received. After earn-
ing five stickers (i.e., after completing half of
the trainings) they received a prize – either a
pen or a keychain. After earning 10 stickers (i.e.,
at the end of training), the children could choose
a prize worth about 12 €.
Results
Mixed-effects ANOVA, with covariate mea-
sures of training performance, was used for sta-
tistical modeling. All analyses were carried out
using R (R Core Team, 2015) with the STAN
(Hoffman & Gelman, 2011) and several additional
packages (supplementary material: [1] data:
http://goo.gl/T63DA8, [2] statistical modeling:
http://goo.gl/FleUoy ).
Firstly, we present the effects of practice, that
is, improvement of training tasks performance.
Next, we examine near transfer effects for atten-
tion, using the following measures of the d2
test: perceptual speed, overall perceptual abil-
ity, hits, omissions, false alarms, discriminability
(d’), and bias (c’). Finally, we present far trans-
fer effect for fluid intelligence.
Practice Effects
Table 1 shows the inprovement in training task
performance (decreased number of errors and
increased numer of correct responses). We can
see a comparison between the first and last train-
ing sessions. The relevant statistics are: t(25) =
3.08, p = 0.002, d = 0.6, for Task 1 (Fish),  t(25) =
2.74,  p = 0.005, d = 0.54, for Task 2 (Easter eggs),
t(26) = 3.15, p = 0.002, d = 0.61, for Task 3 (Apple),
and t(26) = 4.66, p < 0.001, d = 0.89, for Task 4
(Jigsaw). The effects presented in Table 1 justify
the conclusion that the training procedures
proved their effectiveness. It is therefore reason-
able to expect possible near transfer and far trans-
fer effects. Changes of performance across train-
ing sessions are presented in Figure 1.
Table 1 Practice effects: The results (means and standard deviations) obtained by the ex-
perimental group in four training tasks, depending on the training session
 1st session 10th session 
t value 
10th vs 1st session 
Task 1. Fish 1     0.25 (0.09)   0.21 (0.08) -3.08** 
Task 2. Easter eggs 1 0.03 (0.05)   0.01 (0.01) -2.74** 
Task 3. Apples 1 0.24 (0.21) 0.10 (0.1) -3.15** 
Task 4. Jigsaw 2  1.67 (21.43)   24.85 (20.48)    4.66*** 
Note. 1 Ratio of the number of errors to the total number of responses. 
2 The number of correct responses minus the number of errors. 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Near Transfer Effects: Attention
Results obtained by both groups in the d2
test and RPM are presented in Table 2.
A single-step multiple comparisons correction
based on joint t distribution of the linear func-
tion (Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall, 2008; Bretz,
Hothorn, & Westfall, 2010) was applied for each
dependent variable. Additionally, we provide
confidence intervals for each comparison.
Perceptual Speed
The analysis revealed a significant main ef-
fect of measurement for the number of processed
items (F(1,47) = 25.28, p < 0.0001, η2 = .08), indi-
cating that both groups performed better in the
posttest. There was no significant between-
group difference for the pretest (0.34, 95% CI:
[-43.24 – 43.93], t = 0.02, p = 0.98). After training
sessions, the control group improved by 45.5
(95% CI: [19.48 – 71.52], t = 4.4, p < .001) and
the experimental group by 24.63 (95% CI:
[1.14 – 48.12], t = 2.64, p = .02). This improve-
ment was not maintained for the experimental
group in the follow-up test, as the number of
processed items decreased by 39.89 (95% CI:
[18.47 – 61.31], t = 4.23, p = .0002) compared to
the posttest and decreased by 15.26 compared
to the pretest (95% CI: [-36.68 – 6.16], t = 1.62,
Figure 1 Changes of performance across training sessions
Solid horizontal bars in boxes denote the median. Top and bottom edges of the box represent
75% and 25% quartile, respectively. The top and bottom whiskers denote maximum and minimum
values after excluding the outliers. The points above and below the whiskers represent outliers.
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p = .11). Lack of convincing between group dif-
ferences suggests that improvement in process-
ing speed was not specifically related to atten-
tion training.
Overall Perceptual Ability
A similar pattern was found for overall per-
ceptual ability (Table 2). There was a signifi-
cant main effect for measurement (F(1,47) =
29.48, p < .0001, η2 = 0.1). Groups did not differ
in the pretest scores (1.04, 95% CI: [-41.25 –
43.34], t = 0.06, p = 0.95). The control group
improved by 44.09 (95% CI: [17.92 – 70.27], t =
4.23, p < 0.001) and the experimental group by
32.11 (95% CI: [8.49 – 55.74], t = 3.42, p = .003).
Follow-up tests did not show evidence for per-
sistence of training effects in the experimental
group, as the scores decreased by 35.67 com-
pared to the posttest (95% CI: [15.29 - 56.04], t =
3.98, p < .001) and did not differ from pretests
(-3.55, 95% CI: [-23.93 – 16.82], t = 0.4, p = 0.69).
This effect also cannot be explained specifically
by attention training.
Hits
There was a main effect of measurement for
the number of hits (Table 2, F(1,47) = 25.32, p <
.0001, η2 = 0.1). The experimental group had 15.21
more hits in the pretest (95% CI: [-4.7 – 35.12], t
= 1.92, p = 0.11) compared to the control group.
Table 2 Descriptive (means and standard deviations) statistics concerning the performance
measures
Performance 
measure 
Group Pretest Posttest Follow-up 
t value   
pre- vs. 
posttest 
t value 
pretest vs. 
follow-up 
Perceptual speed 
CTRL 
EXP 
237.55 (66.16) 
237.89 (58.79) 
283.05 (63.32) 
262.52 (54.31) 
 
222.63 (30.91) 
 4.4*** 
 2.64* 
 
-1.62 
Overall perceptual 
ability 
CTRL 
EXP 
220.36 (64.5) 
221.41 (52.4) 
264.45 (63.92) 
253.52 (54.89) 
 
217.85 (30.87) 
 4.23*** 
 3.42** 
 
-0.4 
Hits 
CTRL 
EXP 
75.27 (32.95) 
90.48 (20.08) 
97.5 (33.87) 
104.85 (23.63) 
 
97.37 (12.31) 
 4.12*** 
 2.95** 
  
2.01* 
Omissions 
CTRL 
EXP 
13 (11.74) 
11.78 (15.27) 
12.36 (10.97) 
7.33 (11.73) 
 
0.89 (1.67) 
-0.26 
-2.01 
 
-4.31** 
False alarms 
CTRL 
EXP 
4.18 (5.4) 
4.7 (4.71) 
6.23 (7.71) 
1.67 (2.59) 
 
3.89 (2.61) 
 2.11 
-3.47** 
 
-1.02 
Discriminability 
(d’) 
CTRL 
EXP 
3.22 (0.85) 
3.46 (0.76) 
3.35 (0.86) 
4.35 (0.8) 
 
4.45 (0.41) 
 0.79 
 6.00*** 
 
 5.9*** 
Bias (c’) 
CTRL 
EXP 
0.48 (0.29) 
0.25 (0.36) 
0.37 (0.33) 
0.36 (0.33) 
 
-0.3 (1.11) 
-1.61 
 1.85 
 
-8.47*** 
RPM 
CTRL 
EXP 
27.68 (8.07) 
29.63 (7.21) 
28.09 (9.13) 
31.19 (7.83) 
 
30.93 (6.63) 
 0.43 
 1.8 
  
1.57 
Note. Perceptual speed: The number of items scanned during the five minutes period. Overall perceptual 
ability: The number of scanned items minus the number of errors (interpreted as an index of overall 
efficiency of attention). Hits: The number of correctly spotted signals (properly labeled ‘d’ letters). 
Misses: The number of missed signals. False alarms: The number of erroneously detected non-signals 
(other than properly labeled ‘d’ letters). Discriminability (d’): ability to discriminate between signal and 
noise. Bias: response strategy – lower values indicate more conservative approach. RPM: Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices score. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Number of hits increased by 22.23 (95% CI: [8.69
– 35.76], t = 4.12, p < 0.001) in the control group
and by 14.37 (95% CI: [2.15 – 26.59], t = 2.95, p =
0.009) in the experimental group. Follow-up
tests revealed that the number of hits remained
6.89 higher (95% CI: [-1.22 – 15], t = 1.93, p =
0.07) compared to the pretest and dropped by
7.48 (95% CI: [-0.63 – 15.59], t = 2.01, p = 0.07)
compared to the posttest. Though the differ-
ence in pretest scores necessitates caution with
interpretation, analyses indicate a specific ef-
fect of attention training on the number of de-
tected items in the d2 test. Moreover, this effect
persisted over an extended period of time to the
follow-up test.
Omissions
Mixed-effects ANOVA revealed no significant
main effects and interactions for the number of
omissions (Table 2). However, a significant ef-
fect of measurement (F(1.68, 43.55) = 9.37, p =
.0008, ç2 = 0.14) was found for the experimental
group only. The number of omissions in the
experimental group was lower in the follow-up
test by 10.89 (95% CI: [5.14 – 16.64], t = 4.31, p =
.0001) compared to the pretest and by 6.44
(95% CI: [0.69 – 12.19], t = 2.55, p = 0.01) com-
pared to the posttest. As we can see, the num-
ber of omissions in the experimental group de-
creased after training, which may be an effect
specific for attention training.
False Alarms
There was a significant group x measurement
interaction (Table 2, F (1,47) = 15.14, p = .0003,
η2 = 0.06) for the number of false alarms, with-
out significant main effects. The difference be-
tween groups in the pre-test was negligible (.52,
95% CI: [-3.28 – 4.52], t = 0.35, p = 0.73). The
experimental group decreased the number of
false alarms in the posttest by 3.04 (95% CI:
[0.84 – 5.24, t = 3.47, p = 0.002), but the control
group increased the number of false alarms by
2.05 (95% CI: [-0.39 – 4.48], t = 2.11, p = 0.08).
Contrasts between groups showed a larger ef-
fect in the experimental group by 5.08 (95% CI:
[1.8 – 8.36], t = 3.89, p < 0.001). Follow-up tests
showed an increase in false alarm rate compared
to the posttest by 2.22 (95% CI: [0.4 – 4.04], t =
2.78, p = 0.015) and was only slightly lower than
for the pretest (0.81, 95% CI: [-1 – 2.63], t = 1.01,
p = 0.31). This result indicates that attention
training had a specific positive effect on the
number of false alarms.
Discriminability and Bias
The decrease in the frequency of false alarms
and omissions, coupled with the increase in the
information processing speed and hits, sug-
gests that children who underwent attention
training were more careful during the task. The
control group participants also improved infor-
mation processing speed and the number of hits,
but at the expense of more false alarms. We in-
terpret these findings in terms of SDT‘s (Sig-
nal Detection Theory, Green & Swets, 1966)
constructs of discriminability (d’) and bias (c’).
Both parameters were calculated using a Baye-
sian hierarchical model (Lee & Wagenmakers,
2013), separately for each group and measure-
ment. Maximum a posteriori estimates were fur-
ther analyzed using mixed-effects ANOVA.
The results are presented in Table 2. The
analysis revealed a significant main effect of
group for discriminability (F(1,47) = 9.13, p =
.004, η2 = 0.13), a main effect of measurement
(F(1,47) = 21.23, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.09), and a
group x measurement interaction (F(1,47) =
11.79, p = 0.001, η2 = .05). The difference be-
tween experimental and control groups for the
pretest was small: d’ was 0.24 larger in the ex-
perimental group (95% CI: [-0.34 – 0.83], t = 1.04,
p = .5). The index d’ did not change after train-
ing in the control group (0.13, 95% CI: [-0.28 –
0.54], t = 0.79, p = 0.5), but increased in the ex-
Studia Psychologica, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2017, 50-65                   59
perimental group by 0.89 (95% CI: [0.52 – 1.26],
t = 5.99, p < .0001). The increase in experimental
group was 0.76 higher (95% CI: [0.21 – 1.31], t =
3.43, p = .002) than in the control group. The
effect of training was maintained in the follow-
up test. The index d’ remained .99 higher
(95% CI: [0.61 – 1.38], t = 5.89, p < .0001) com-
pared to pretest and was higher by .11 (95% CI:
[-0.28 – 0.49], t = 0.63, p = 0.53) compared to the
posttest. Means and confidence intervals for
d’ are provided in Figure 2. These results indi-
cate that there was a specific effect of attention
training on the ability to distinguish signals from
noise in the d2 test (see: Figure 2).
For bias, there was a significant group x mea-
surement interaction (Table 2, Figure 3,
F(1,47) = 5.91, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.03). Bias was
higher in the pretest for the control group com-
pared to the experimental group by 0.23 (95%
CI: [0 – 0.46], t = 2.41, p = .06). After training,
bias decreased in the control group by 0.11 (95%
CI: [-0.06 – 0.29], t = 1.61, p = 0.11) but increased
in the experimental group by 0.12 (95% CI: [-.04
– .27], t = 1.85, p = 0.07). The difference between
experimental and control groups was 0.23 (95%
CI: [0 – .46], t = 2.43, p = 0.06).
Follow-up tests in the experimental group
showed a large decrease in bias for the experi-
mental group compared to both the pretest (0.55,
95% CI: [0.4 – 0.69], t = 8.48, p < .0001) and the
posttest (0.67, 95% CI: [0.52 – 0.81], t = 10.29,
p < 0.001). Means and standard deviations for
bias are shown in Figure 3. In addition to better
discrimination of signal and noise, attention
training shifted the strategy towards a more
conservative approach. The control group
showed the opposite effect in terms of strat-
egy: it became more liberal. However, bias in
the follow-up indicates that participants became
even more liberal than in the pretest (see: Fig-
ure 3).
Far Transfer Effects: Fluid Intelligence
Table 2 also demonstrates the results obtained
by two groups in the intelligence test and Fig-
ure 4 illustrates these findings. No significant
training effects were revealed for RPM scores,
Figure 2 The value of d’ depending on the group and the time of measurement
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Figure 3 The value of bias depending on the group and the time of measurement
Figure 4 Raw scores in Raven’s Progressive Matrices depending on the group and the time of
measurement
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with negligible improvement in both groups
(main effects: F(1,47) = 1.3, p = 0.26, η2 = 0.02,
and F(1,47) = 2.33, p = 0.13, η2 = 0.004, for group
and measurement, respectively; interaction:
F(1,47) = 0.79, p = 0.38, η2 = 0.001). However,
there seems to be a slight (although non-sig-
nificant) increase in the posttest RPM score for
the experimental group. This improvement
seems to persist in the follow-up test. In order
to make sure that the training intervention did
not result in enhancement of intelligence, we
performed a Bayesian analysis and computed
Bayes Factors (BF), which is a method to esti-
mate the likelihood of the null hypothesis (Kass
& Raftery, 1995). BF greater than one indicates
that the null hypothesis gained greater prob-
ability than the alternative one. Concerning the
pretest-posttest difference in the experimental
group, BF obtained the value 1.0, indicating that
the null hypothesis (i.e., training does not work)
should not be rejected, although it appeared
exactly as probable as the alternative hypoth-
esis (i.e., training works). However, BF concern-
ing the pretest vs. follow-up test obtained the
value 1.2, which means that the null hypothesis
appeared slightly more likely than the alterna-
tive one. As to the control group, the BF ob-
tained the value 5.0, which means that the null
hypothesis was five times more likely than the
alternative hypothesis. Altogether, we interpret
these findings in terms of inefficiency of atten-
tion training for enhancement of general fluid
intelligence (Gf).
Discussion
We found that children in the experimental
group improved their performance in the atten-
tion test, increasing the number of analyzed items
and detected signals, while decreasing the num-
ber of false alarms and omissions. Moreover,
the SDT analysis confirmed that children from
the experimental group changed their strategy,
by becoming more careful in the d2 task. They
also exhibited higher discriminability scores,
indicating improved ability to differentiate sig-
nals from noise. Three months following the
completion of training, their processing speed
went down and the false alarm rate returned to
initial levels, but the higher number of hits and
lower number of omissions persisted. As for
the SDT indices, improved discriminability was
maintained but the strategy returned to a less
careful one. So, the benefits of attention train-
ing persisted in only one aspect of the d2 test
performance.
The improvement of attention observed im-
mediately after training did not extend to
children’s intelligence test scores. This ab-
sence of far transfer probably cannot be ex-
plained by duration of training, because in
other studies (e.g., Rueda et al., 2005) effects
were observed after an even shorter interven-
tion. The children’s age does not seem to be
crucial, either. Although there is much evi-
dence suggesting that training may be more
effective in the case of younger children
(Wass, Scerif, & Johnson, 2014), there are stud-
ies demonstrating enhancement of intelligence
in young and older adults as well (e.g.,
Karbach & Kray, 2009).
One possible explanation is that the relation-
ship between intelligence and attention is not
as direct, or as strong, as in the case of other
functions. This conclusion is consistent with
previous studies reporting that working memory
is strongly related to intelligence, while other
cognitive functions, such as attention, are as-
sociated with measures of intelligence only
modestly or not at all (e.g., Engle, Tuholski,
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). Moreover, in most
studies demonstrating the existence of a rela-
tionship between attention and intelligence, ex-
ecutive functions, such as inhibition, attention
shifting, and working memory updating, were
not assessed separately for their effect on in-
telligence test scores. Friedman et al. (2006)
addressed this issue in a study of 234 individu-
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als who performed nine tasks, three for each
cognitive function, that are documented in the
literature to assess inhibitory control, attention
shifting, and working memory updating. Factor
analysis indicated that for both fluid and crys-
tallized intelligence only the association with
memory updating was significant, explaining
41% to 48% of the variance. Other cognitive
functions explained only 2% to 14% of the vari-
ance. Mogle, Lovett, Stawski, and Sliwinski
(2008) also hypothesized that attention is not
related to intelligence, and that the only impor-
tant factor is the ability to accurately extract
information from memory. In addition, Unsworth
and Engle (2006) believed that the results that
were previously interpreted as supporting the
attention-intelligence relationship might instead
result from misinterpretation of working memory
indices. These hypotheses are supported by
the data from trainings, in which improvements
in fluid intelligence usually took place after ex-
ercising executive functions and working
memory. It is worth noting that both Karbach
and Kray‘s (2009) and Rueda et al.’s (2005)
trainings involved executive functions, which
may be more important for intelligence than the
attentional abilities investigated in our experi-
ment.
Our results seem compatible with the three-
stratum theory of intelligence (Carroll, 1993,
1997; see also: Jensen, 1998). We definitely did
not find any evidence that the g-factor (stratum
III) might be enhanced through planned train-
ing of attention. Broad abilities (stratum II) were
not affected by training, either, since this layer
includes general fluid intelligence (Gf), assessed
with Raven’s matrices; we did not observe any
transfer effects. Thus, we conclude that our
training games enhanced narrow abilities (stra-
tum I), in particular, the ability to concentrate
attention and to avoid careless production of
false alarms. Some authors (e.g., te Nijenhuis,
Vianen, & van der Flier, 2007) claim that cogni-
tive training does not in fact affect the third
stratum but only the lowest level of the hierar-
chy, consisting of specific abilities that closely
resemble the trained skills. In our study, there
was not much similarity between training games
and criterial tests, so we conclude that our par-
ticipants improved their narrow cognitive abili-
ties rather than just specific testing skills. How-
ever, the problem of task specificity in cogni-
tive training must be taken seriously (see: Klauer
& Phye, 2008; Stankov, 1986; Herrnstein,
Nickerson, Desanchez, & Swets, 1986).
Despite the failure to observe any improve-
ment in fluid intelligence, enhancement of at-
tention after only five hours of practice is a
promising result. Since attention deficits are
common in children and primarily manifest as
neurodevelopmental disorders such as ADHD
(Bulut, 2005), it is important to develop effec-
tive tools to support and enhance this cogni-
tive function. Besides, attention is particularly
important for children’s academic achievement.
Duncan et al. (2007), who analyzed the results
of six longitudinal studies of children and ado-
lescents, found that the strongest predictors of
academic outcomes were: 1) the ability to focus
attention and 2) basic academic skills, such as
counting and reading. Our findings suggest
that, in general, training children’s attention is
possible and worthwhile.
It is worth noting that the analysis of dis-
criminability and bias parameters allowed us to
pinpoint that children discriminated signals from
noise more easily after attention training, while
simultaneously promoting a more cautious strat-
egy. The observed change in strategy is note-
worthy because cognitive strategies play an
important role in human intellectual activity, in-
cluding intelligence (Hunt, 1980). In the present
study, the change in strategy did not affect fluid
intelligence. However, adoption of a strategy
that involves a decreased tendency to commit
false alarms may help to exert inhibitory control
of impulsive reactions. This might prove useful
in school, where it is often necessary to fully
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consider the available options before respond-
ing. Adopting a “careful” strategy can there-
fore improve children’s use of the knowledge
that they already possess.
As to limitations of this study, the five-hour
training might be considered as relatively short.
Next, a larger and heterogeneous transfer task
battery would be advisable, in order to identify
the specific aspects of attention that change
due to training. Also, the concept of intelligence
is broad and heterogeneous, including the as-
pects that were totally neglected in our study,
such as practical intelligence or solving ill-de-
fined problems (Ruisel, 2003). Lack of random-
ization, forced by practical reasons, is also a
significant limitation of this study, but this is
the case of many studies of cognitive trainings.
The change in strategic behavior would need
to be evaluated concerning its generalization
across different tasks. Furthermore, the “care-
ful” type of strategy is typically associated with
academic outcomes, so in future studies it might
be advisable to use a test of crystallized intelli-
gence and to control for academic performance
before and after training. The application of
selected subscales of the Wechsler Intelligence
test might also provide more conclusive results
(McDougall & House, 2012). Moreover, it would
be worthwhile to introduce tasks that could
measure the extent to which the practiced skills
transfer to everyday situations.
Altogether, we believe that attention is sus-
ceptible to improvement through planned in-
terventions, although far transfer effects to fluid
intelligence seem hard to corroborate.
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